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This study examined the influence of need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) on adaptive
and maladaptive responses to fear appeals. After measuring their need for cognition, partici-
pants read a high versus low threat message about breast cancer, followed by a persuasive mes-
sage that recommended breast self-examination. Interaction effects between need for cognition
and threat on measures of precautionary motivation supported our main hypothesis that fear ap-
peals only result in adaptive coping (i.e., danger control) among respondents who are high in
need for cognition. If possible, persuasive communicators may thus consider screening partici-
pants first on their need for cognition. On the other hand, predicted main effects of threat infor-
mation on maladaptive coping (i.e., fear control) suggest that fear appeals should be used with
caution, preceded by extensive pilot testing.
An important goal of persuasive communications, and health
education messages in particular, is to encourage and moti-
vate people to engage in health promoting and disease pre-
ventive behaviors. One way of achieving this goal is to con-
front target groups with fear appeals related to the health
issue at hand (i.e., breast cancer among women in this study).
Fear appeals are persuasive communications attempting to
arouse fear to promote precautionary motivation and
self-protective action (cf. Rogers, 1983). Typically, a fear ap-
peal is organized in such a way that, first, threat information
is presented that describes a severe threat and the person’s
susceptibility to it (e.g., “Breast cancer is a deadly disease
and women may acquire it”), followed by coping information
outlining the feasibility and effectiveness of a recommended
action (e.g., “Breast self-examination is easy to perform and
may help you in detecting breast cancer in an early and there-
fore better treatable stage”).
More than 5 decades of systematic research into fear ap-
peals have produced numerous studies testing the effects of
threat and coping information on measures of attitudes, in-
tentions, and behaviors, which are all considered to be indic-
ative of precautionary motivation and action (for overviews
of studies, see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Higbee, 1969; Rogers
& Prentice-Dunn, 1997; Ruiter, Abraham, & Kok, 2001;
Sutton, 1982; for meta-analyses, see Floyd, Prentice-Dunn,
& Rogers, 2000; Milne, Sheeran, & Orbell, 2000; Witte &
Allen, 2000). More specifically, empirical data on the topic
of performing breast self-examination suggest that threaten-
ing information about breast cancer motivates both adaptive
(e.g., intention to perform breast self-examination) and
maladaptive (e.g., avoid thinking about breast cancer) action,
whereas coping information is essential in determining
whether adaptive or maladaptive action is undertaken in re-
sponse to the threat (Prentice-Dunn, Floyd, & Flournoy,
2001; Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987; for a discussion about the
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relationship between threat and coping information, see
Ruiter, Abraham, et al., 2001).
THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE
VARIABLES
The majority of fear appeal studies examined the effects of
situational variables on processes of intention formation and
behavioral change. These situational variables, for example,
include the threat and coping information components of a
fear appeal, but also variables such as the provision of spe-
cific action instructions (e.g., Leventhal, Singer, & Jones,
1965). In addition to situational variables, individual differ-
ence variables could be a significant source of variance in re-
actions to fear appeals. However, only a limited number of
studies have addressed the role of individual difference vari-
ables in explaining the effects of fear appeals. The only per-
sonal variable that received considerable attention has been
trait anxiety, which is defined as one’s general level of anxi-
ety in reaction to personal threats (Spielberger, Gorsuch, &
Lushene, 1970). A recent meta-analysis by Witte and Allen
(2000) found no associations, however, between one’s level
of trait anxiety and cognitive and behavioral responses to-
ward fear appeals. Because the focus on individual difference
variables has been too limited to date, more research is re-
quired investigating other individual difference variables and
their influences on fear appeals.
In this study, we focused on individual differences in need
for cognition, which has been defined by Cacioppo and Petty
(1982) as people’s “tendency … to engage in and enjoy
thinking” (p. 116). Although need for cognition has been
shown to significantly influence persuasion processes (for a
review, see Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996), no
research to date – to our knowledge—has been published that
examined its influence on responses to fear appeals. There-
fore, the purpose of this study was to test whether need for
cognition significantly moderates responses to fear appeals.
Before describing and discussing the hypotheses, methods
and results of our study, we will briefly review the effects of
fear appeals on danger-oriented and fear-oriented coping re-
sponses and the role of need for cognition in these processes.
REACTIONS TO FEAR APPEALS: DANGER
CONTROL VERSUS FEAR CONTROL
Several theoretical models have been formulated to explain
the effects of fear appeals on precautionary motivation and
self-protective action; among those are the drive reduction
model (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; Janis, 1967;
McGuire, 1968; McGuire, 1969), the parallel response
model (Leventhal, 1970), and the protection motivation the-
ory (Rogers, 1975, 1983). In general, these models (for a
review of these models, see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) as-
sume that threat information is only effective in inducing
attitudinal and behavioral change if threat perceivers belief
that they have the necessary coping abilities to avert the
threat. That is, only if people believe that the recommended
action can avert the threat (referred to as response efficacy;
Rogers, 1975) and they feel confident to perform the rec-
ommended action (referred to as self-efficacy; Bandura,
1986; Rogers, 1983), are they willing to perform the rec-
ommended threat-averting action.
Fear appeals are not always effective persuasion means.
Indeed, especially when people do not feel able to suffi-
ciently control the presented threat, they may deny or dero-
gate the information included in the fear appeal, as such re-
vealing no attitudinal or behavioral changes (e.g., Leventhal,
1970). In an attempt to explain defensive reactions to fear ap-
peals, in addition to adaptive reactions, Witte (1992a) pro-
posed the extended parallel process model (EPPM), which
combines the previously mentioned theoretical frameworks.
This model emphasizes the central role of fear arousal and its
influence on defensive responses, such as message avoidance
and denial. More specifically, EPPM specifies two cognitive
processes in response to threatening information: danger
control and fear control (see also Leventhal, 1970, and Laza-
rus’ similar distinction between problem-focused and emo-
tion-focused coping responses to stressful events; e.g., Laza-
rus & Folkman, 1984). Danger control is defined as a
cognitive process in which people evaluate the presented
threat (including the assessment of threat seriousness and
personal susceptibility) and suggested coping responses (in-
cluding the assessment of response efficacy and self-effi-
cacy). High threat perception combined with high efficacy
beliefs may prompt acceptance of the recommended precau-
tion as evidenced by positive changes in attitude, intention,
and behavior (see also protection motivation theory, Rogers,
1983). Fear control, on the other hand, operates when threat
is high but efficacy is low due to either situational (e.g., no
specific instructions) or personal (e.g., lack of experience)
variables. Feelings of helplessness due to low efficacy beliefs
may then result in increased feelings of fear and attempts to
reduce the unpleasant experience of fear through avoidance,
denial, or derogation of the message (Witte, 1992a; see also
Prentice-Dunn et al., 2001; Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987),
whereas maintaining or even intensifying the risk behavior
generating the threat (see also Rogers, 1983). Fear control is
defined as an affect-driven cognitive response that is
maladaptive because it is not aimed at effectively reducing
the presented threat.
In general, empirical studies have found considerable sup-
port for the message components that comprise an effective
fear appeal. Threat information and coping information are
essential for effective communication to occur (Eagly &
Chaiken, 1993; Floyd et al., 2000; Milne et al., 2000; Ruiter,
Abraham, et al., 2001; Sutton, 1982). However, to go one
step further in testing the effects of fear appeals, it would be
helpful to assess how different manners of processing (i.e.,







heuristic versus systematic) influence the effects of threat
and coping information. These processes may shed more
light on the type of responses (danger or fear control) people
may show as a function of fear appeals. One individual dif-
ference variable that is particularly useful in this perspective
is need for cognition.
NEED FOR COGNITION
Need for cognition is a relatively stable individual differ-
ence variable that systematically influences the way people
cognitively process presented information. In their review
of the literature on need for cognition, Cacioppo, Petty,
Feinstein, and Jarvis (1996) concluded that “Individuals
who differ in terms of their need for cognition also differ in
terms of their tendency to engage in effortful cognitive ac-
tivity when given a task or making sense of the world, ac-
tively acquire information about a relevant stimulus or
event, and enjoy (or are less stressed by) cognitively
effortful problems, life circumstances, or tasks” (p. 243).
People high in need for cognition thus seem to engage more
in systematic message-oriented thinking than people low in
need for cognition (e.g., Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1983).
The role of need for cognition in how people deal with
persuasive messages has particularly been examined within
the context of the elaboration likelihood model (Petty &
Cacioppo, 1986) and similar dual process models of attitude
change, such as Chaiken’s heuristic-systematic model (e.g.,
Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996; Chaiken, Liberman,
& Eagly, 1989). These models suggest that attitudes can be
formed and changed via two distinct routes of information
processing. For example, the elaboration likelihood model
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) distinguishes between a central
and a peripheral information-processing route. The former
route evokes cognitive change based on an elaborate process-
ing of presented arguments, whereas peripheral route pro-
cessing can result in cognitive change due to other character-
istics of the message (e.g., the expertise of the source) and
simple decision rules or heuristics (e.g., “an expert should
know what is best”). In general, central or systematic route
attitude changes have been found to be more stable and
predictive of behavior and more resistant to counter-
argumentation than peripheral or heuristic route attitude
changes (for useful reviews, see Chaiken & Trope, 1999;
Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).
Research on persuasive communication has illustrated
that individual differences in need for cognition influence the
route taken by recipients of a persuasive message. The review
by Cacioppo et al. (1996) indeed showed that people high in
need for cognition process persuasive messages more sys-
tematically than people low in need for cognition. For exam-
ple, Cacioppo et al. (1983) demonstrated that those high in
need for cognition engaged more in elaborate and systematic
processing as evidenced by their capacity to discriminate be-
tween strong and weak arguments. Moreover, those low in
need for cognition have been found to be more persuaded by
specific peripheral features of the message (i.e., attractive-
ness of the source), suggesting their frequent use of heuristic
processing (e.g., Axsom, Yates, & Chaiken, 1987).
Taken together, need for cognition influences the way
people cognitively deal with persuasive communications
with high need for cognition leading to more message-ori-
ented processing, and also more effective solving of prob-
lems that require effortful thinking (e.g., course perfor-
mance), than low need for cognition (Cacioppo et al.,
1996). Furthermore, and particularly important to this
study, Cacioppo et al. concluded that people who differ in
need for cognition do not differ in their emotional reactions
toward social stimuli. However, this latter conclusion seems
to be mainly based on research that found no or only mod-
est (negative) relationships between need for cognition and
affect-related individual difference variables such as affect
orientation, affect intensity, and state and trait anxiety (see
Cacioppo et al., 1996, Table 2). In this study, a more direct
test of the relationship between need for cognition and
emotional reactions is provided by looking at the role of
need for cognition in reactions to threatening information.
FEAR APPEALS AND NEED FOR COGNITION:
HYPOTHESES
A large number of studies has illustrated that the effects of
fear appeals on precautionary motivation are inconsistent
(Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Floyd et al., 2000; Higbee, 1969;
Milne et al., 2000; Ruiter, Abraham, et al., 2001; Sutton,
1982). One possible variable that may explain this inconsis-
tency is people’s need for cognition. Indeed, Cacioppo et al.’s
(1996) conclusion that people high in need for cognition
spend more cognitive effort on persuasive information, are
more effective problem solvers, but do not react more emo-
tionally to social stimuli, seems to suggest that need for cog-
nition may moderate the effects of fear appeals on (prob-
lem-driven) danger control processes, but not those on
(affect-driven) fear control processes. That is, assuming that
people high in need for cognition more critically read the
coping information in the fear appeal and subsequently eval-
uate the recommended action as effective and feasible,
chances are higher that they will perform the recommended
action (i.e., danger control) as compared to people low in
need for cognition. The latter’s attitude toward the recom-
mended action might be equally positive, but it will be less
predictive of intention and behavior due to less systematic
processing (cf. Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Fear control, on the
other hand, is largely the result of emotional reactions to
threat information. Cacioppo et al.’s conclusion that people
who differ in need for cognition do not differ in their emo-
tional reactions to stimuli suggested that individual differ-







ences in need for cognition will not moderate the effects of
fear appeals on fear control responses.
Following from the previous reasoning, two hypotheses
were delineated. First, we assume that threat information will
result in more adaptive coping (i.e., danger control) among
people high in need for cognition than among people low in
need for cognition. Thus, an interaction effect between need
for cognition and threat information on danger control re-
sponses (i.e., attitude, intention, behavior) is predicted. To be
more specific, the effect of threat information on danger con-
trol responses is expected to be significant among people
high in need for cognition, but not among those low in need
for cognition (Hypothesis 1).
Second, we assume that fear control responses in reaction
to a fear appeal will not be moderated by individual differ-
ences in need for cognition. Thus, we predict a main effect of
threat information on fear control responses (i.e., defensive
avoidance, message derogation, perceived manipulation),
which is not qualified by an interaction with participants’
need for cognition (Hypothesis 2).
METHOD
Participants and Design
Randomly, 77 first-year undergraduate women from the De-
partment of Psychology at Universiteit Maastricht were dis-
tributed across the conditions of a one-factorial (Threat: low
versus high) between-subject design. Participants could sign
up for a series of behavioral science studies, whereby they
would receive a monetary reward in return (4, approxi-
mately $4 U.S., in this study). Participants left their names
and telephone numbers on the sign-up forms and were later
invited to the laboratory.
Procedure and Materials
On arrival in the laboratory, participants were welcomed by a
female experimenter. Participants were seated in separate cu-
bicles that were equipped with a computer and were told that
they would participate in two unrelated studies. The experi-
ment was completely computer-controlled. In the first part of
this study, need for cognition was assessed by means of the
Dutch translation of the 18-item need for cognition scale
(Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984; for a list of the Dutch items,
see Pieters, Verplanken, & Modde, 1987). Participants were
told that the items were translated from English into Dutch and
were the object of a validation study by a graduate student. The
scale used in this study revealed a good internal reliability
(Cronbach’s α = .80) and was characterized by one dominant
factor accounting for 25.2% of the variance (with the second
and the third factor accounting for 9.2% and 7.8% of the vari-
ance, respectively). These results are similar to the findings of
other studies (see Cacioppo et al., 1996), and in particular to
the findings in Dutch samples reported by Verplanken and col-
leagues (Pieters et al., 1987; Verplanken, 1989, 1991, 1993;
Verplanken, Hazenberg, & Palenewen, 1992).
After they finished the need for cognition scale, partici-
pants were introduced to the second part of the study. They
were told that they would be presented a message about
breast cancer, and were asked to read this message carefully.
At this moment, the manipulation of threat was introduced.
The threatening messages were similar to the ones used by
Ruiter and colleagues (Ruiter, Kok, Verplanken, & Brug,
2001; Ruiter, Verplanken, Kok, & Werrij, 2003). Recipients
in the high threat condition read information that stressed the
severity of breast cancer and recipients’ susceptibility to it.
They were told that they could already develop breast cancer
in their younger years. This was mainly done by introducing
the topic of breast cancer by means of a photograph of a peer
group member on the computer screen who ostensibly stated
that she discovered breast cancer herself after participating in
the same study last year. The severity of breast cancer was
emphasized by describing breast cancer as a very serious dis-
ease with significant physical and emotional consequences
that often ends in death. This written information was illus-
trated with photographic material showing pictures of
women that had undergone amputation of one of the breasts.
In the low threat condition the picture of the same girl was
used, but she stated that this study was part of a research pro-
ject she was carrying out. The participant’s susceptibility to
breast cancer was described as low, for example, by stating
that “Breast cancer is a form of cancer that is most common
among women older than 50 years of age”, and by describing
the Dutch medical examination program for breast cancer,
which invites biannually all women between 50 and 70 years
of age to undergo a mammography. The severity of breast
cancer was ignored by providing boring, biological informa-
tion about the development of breast cancer along with pic-
tures of cell divisions. Both messages were equal in length
and contained the same number of photographs.
Next, fear arousal was measured by means of four items
on a 9-point scale (i.e., “As you read the message about breast
cancer, did you feel … worried, afraid, uncomfortable,
frightened”, ranging from 1 [not at all] to 9 [very much]; cf.
Mewborn & Rogers, 1979; Ruiter, Kok, et al., 2001; Ruiter,
Verplanken, et al., 2003). These four items were combined to
form an average fear arousal scale (Cronbach’s α = .92).
Then, a message about performing breast self-examination
was presented to the participants stressing its effectiveness of
detecting breast cancer in a better treatable stage and its fea-
sibility (e.g., “By performing breast self-examination you
may easily detect breast cancer in a early stage and thus in-
crease your chances of full recovery from the consequences
of breast cancer.”). Finally, the dependent variables danger
control (attitude and intention) and fear control (defensive
avoidance, message derogation, perceived manipulation)
were measured, followed by measures of efficacy beliefs and







behavior (see later). Except for the dichotomous measure of
behavior (yes–no), all measures used 9-point scales.
The experiment lasted about 30 min. After leaving the cu-
bicles participants were extensively debriefed by the female
experimenter. She was especially alert to any signs of current
fears participants possibly expressed. All participants were
told that their chance of getting breast cancer in their younger
years was very low because it is most common among
women older than 45 years of age. Thereafter, they received
information about breast cancer and breast self-examination
performance issued by the Dutch Cancer Society and were
urged to read it carefully. Participants were then paid and
asked not to talk about the objectives and topic of the study
with fellow students.
Dependent Measures
Danger control. Measures of attitude, intention and
behavior toward performing breast self-examination were
used to operationalize danger control (cf. Witte, Berkowitz,
Cameron, & McKeon, 1998). The attitude toward monthly
breast self-examination was measured through summarizing
the scores on five semantic-differentials: 1 (unimportant) to 9
(important); 1 (bad) to 9 (good); 1 (negative) to 9 (positive);
1 (foolish) to 9 (wise); 1 (insensible) to 9 (sensible) (α = .87).
The intention to perform monthly breast self-examination
was measured with three items—that is, “Do you plan to per-
form a breast self-examination this month?”, 1 (surely not) to
9 (surely yes); “How likely is it that you will examine your
breasts in the next month?”, 1 (extremely unlikely) to 9 (ex-
tremely likely); “I intend to examine my breasts in the next
month”, 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). These
three items were combined to form an average intention
score (α = .91). Before leaving the experimental cubicle, be-
havior was measured on a scale from 0 (no) to 1 (yes) by giv-
ing participants the opportunity to register for a course on
performing breast self-examination. They could write down
their name, address, and telephone number and send this in-
formation to a (nonexisting) e-mail address.
Fear control. Fear control responses were operation-
alized via measures of defensive avoidance, message deroga-
tion, and perceived manipulation (cf. Witte et al., 1998). One
item measured the extent to which participants avoided the
issue of breast cancer—that is, “When I read the message
about breast cancer my first reaction was that I did not want
to think about breast cancer”, 1 (totally disagree) to 9 (totally
agree). To measure the extent to which participants criticized
the threat message, two items—that is, “The information
about breast cancer was … overblown, exaggerated,” 1 (not
at all) to 9 (very much) were combined in one index of mes-
sage derogation (r = .49, p < .001). Finally, two items—that
is, “The information about breast cancer tried to … manipu-
late my feelings, strain the truth,” 1 (totally disagree) to 9 (to-
tally agree) were combined to measure the extent to which
participants thought the threat message deliberately manipu-
lated their feelings (perceived manipulation; r = .33; p < .01).
Efficacy Beliefs
Perceived efficacy of breast self-examination was measured
by averaging the scores on three measures of response effi-
cacy—that is, “If I would get breast cancer, the performance
of breast self-examination will increase my chances to detect
it in an early and treatable stage”; “Examining my breasts ev-
ery month is an effective way to discover breast cancer at an
early stage”; “Detecting breast cancer early strongly im-
proves the chances of being cured,” 1 (totally disagree) to 9
(totally agree) and two measures of self-efficacy—that is,
“Suppose you are planning to do a monthly breast self-exam-
ination, do you feel confident that you will correctly perform
the self-exam?”; “If I wanted to, it would be easy for me to
examine my breasts in the next month”, 1 (surely not) to 9
(surely yes). The combined scale (e.g., Witte et al., 1998) had
a good internal reliability (α = .79).
RESULTS
Analytical Strategy
Hierarchical regression analyses tested the main effects of
Threat (coded as 0 = low, 1 = high) and Need for Cognition
in Step 1, and the interaction term in Step 2, on measures of
fear arousal, efficacy beliefs, and indices of fear control and
danger control. To ensure that multicollinearity did not af-
fect the results, individual scores on Need for Cognition
were centered (i.e., by subtracting the mean from each
score) and the interaction term was based on these centered
scores. In case of a significant contribution of the interac-
tion term to the prediction of the dependent variable, the
main effect of Threat was analyzed for high and low levels
of need for cognition by means of simple slope analyses
(for a more elaborate description of analyzing interactions
in multiple regression, see Aiken & West, 1991). Means,
standard deviations, and intercorrelations for the study vari-
ables are presented in Table 1. All analyses used a signifi-
cance level of p < .05.
Fear Arousal
Table 2 shows that only Threat had a significant contribution
to the prediction of fear arousal. Need for Cognition and the
interaction term were not significantly related to the amount
of reported fear. Respondents in the high threat conditions re-
ported more fear arousal (M = 5.41, SD = 1.74) than respon-
dents in the low threat conditions (M = 3.77, SD = 1.76), thus
proving the effectiveness of the threat manipulation.








The information about breast self-examination was success-
ful in stressing the effectiveness and feasibility of performing
the self-exam. Overall, participants had positive beliefs about
the effectiveness and feasibility of breast self-examination as
the average score on the measure of perceived efficacy
(Moverall = 6.17, SD = 1.30) was significantly higher than the
scale’s midpoint (5.0), t(76) = 7.93, p < .001. Table 2 further
shows that efficacy beliefs were not systematically influ-
enced by Need for Cognition, Threat or their interaction.
Danger Control
Attitude. The main effect terms of Need for Cognition
and Threat were not related to the attitude toward performing
breast self-examination (see Table 3). However, in line with
predictions, the interaction between both variables was sig-
nificant. Simple slope analysis (see Aiken & West, 1991) re-
vealed support for Hypothesis 1 as threat was positively re-
lated to attitude when need for cognition was high, B = 0.64,
t(76) = 1.98, p = .05, whereas Threat was negatively related
to attitude when need for cognition was low, B = –0.68, t(76)
= –2.10, p < .05 (see Figure 1).
Intention. Need for Cognition and Threat had no signif-
icant contribution to the prediction of the intention to per-
form breast self-examination. In line with Hypothesis 1,
however, the interaction between Need for Cognition and
Threat was significant (see Table 3). Simple slope analysis
confirmed that Threat was positively related to intention
when need for cognition was high, B = 1.74, t(76) = 3.09, p <
.01, whereas it had no significant contribution to the predic-
tion of intention when need for cognition was low, B = –0.97,
t(76) = –1.69, p = .10 (see Figure 2).
Behavior. To test for the combined effects of Need for
Cognition and Threat on behavior, a logistic regression
analysis was conducted that regressed the behavioral mea-
sure (i.e., registering for a breast self-examination course)
on Need for Cognition, Threat, and their interaction. The
predicted contribution of the interaction term was margin-
ally significant, Wald (1) = 3.24, p = .07 (see also Table 3).
Simple slope analysis revealed nevertheless support for Hy-
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TABLE 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations of Need for Cognition, Fear Arousal, Efficacy Beliefs, Defensive
Avoidance, Message Derogation, Perceived Manipulation, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 Need for cognition 3.30 0.47 1.00
2 Fear arousal 4.56 1.92 .03 1.00
3 Efficacy beliefs 6.17 1.30 .04 –.04 1.00
4 Defensive avoidance 3.34 2.20 .05 .39*** .00 1.00
5 Message derogation 3.72 1.60 –.05 .17 .05 .12 1.00
6 Perceived manipulation 3.47 1.60 –.04 .32** .20 .29* .50** 1.00
7 Attitude 6.64 1.05 .22 .23* .36*** –.02 –.14 .00 1.00
8 Intention 5.75 1.85 .09 .37*** .31** –.11 –.11 .08 .74** 1.00
9 Behaviora 0.40 0.49 .10 .36** .04 .22 –.05 .11 .37*** .32** 1.00
Note. N = 77.
aSpearman’s rho correlation coefficients for intercorrelations with behavior are reported (all other are Pearson correlation coefficients)
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
TABLE 2
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Fear Arousal and Efficacy Beliefs Measures
Fear Arousal Efficacy Beliefs
Step 1 Step 2a Step 1 Step 2b
Predictor or Statistic B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B
Threat 1.64* 0.40 1.63* 0.40 0.01 0.30 0.01 0.30
Need for cognition –0.02 0.43 –0.43 0.57 0.12 0.32 –0.08 0.43
Threat × Need for Cognition — — 0.94 0.87 — — 0.47 0.65
Regression constant — — 3.75 0.28 — — 6.16 0.21
R2 0.18 0.20 0.00 0.01
Note. N = 77.

































































































































































































































































































pothesis 1: Threat was positively related to behavior when
need for cognition was high, B = 1.57, Wald (1) = 4.94, p <
.05, whereas it had no significant contribution to the predic-
tion of behavior when need for cognition was low, B =
–0.26, Wald (1) = 0.14, p = .71 (see Figure 3).
Fear Control
The findings on indices of fear control supported Hypothe-
sis 2 (see Table 4). Threat was positively related to defen-
sive avoidance (marginally significant, p = .06), message
derogation, and perceived manipulation, whereas no signifi-
cant support was found for Need for Cognition and the
interaction term.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study was to examine the influence of in-
dividual differences in need for cognition on adaptive (i.e.,
danger control) and maladaptive (i.e., fear control) reactions
to fear appeals. Following Cacioppo et al.’s (1996) conclu-
sion that people high in need for cognition have a strong ten-
dency to cognitively tackle presented problems, but do not
react more emotionally to these problems, we predicted, first,
that people high in need for cognition would be more willing
to accept recommended actions that could avert a personally
relevant and serious threat than people low in need for cogni-
tion. Convincing support for this hypothesis on measures of
attitude, intention, and more important, behavior was found.
That is, presenting a serious and personally relevant threat of
breast cancer motivated participants to adopt the recom-
mended response of performing breast self-examination, but
only among those high in need for cognition. Among people
low in need for cognition, presenting threatening information
did not result in greater acceptance of the recommended re-
sponse. Negative regression coefficients on attitude and in-
tention even suggest that these people were less willing to
perform breast self-examination after reading high threat in-
formation about breast cancer than after reading low threat
information.
Second, based on recent studies of fear appeals (e.g.,
Ruiter, Verplanken, et al., 2003; Witte, 1992b; Witte et al.,
1998), we hypothesized that people have a general tendency
to react defensively to threatening messages (i.e., fear con-
trol), irrespective of their levels of need for cognition. This
hypothesis also received strong support. Main effects of the
threat manipulation were found on all three indices of fear
control, supporting the prediction that presenting high threat
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FIGURE 1 Regression slopes arising from the relation between
threat condition and attitude for participants who are relatively high
(one SD [SD = 0.47] greater than the mean, see Aiken & West, 1991)
versus low (one SD less than the mean, see Aiken & West, 1991) in
need for cognition.
FIGURE 2 Regression slopes arising from the relation between
threat condition and intention for participants who are relatively high
(one SD [SD = 0.47] greater than the mean, see Aiken & West, 1991)
versus low (one SD less than the mean, see Aiken & West, 1991) in
need for cognition.
FIGURE 3 Regression slopes arising from the relation between
threat condition and behavior for participants who are relatively high
(one SD [SD = 0.47] greater than the mean, see Aiken & West, 1991)



















































































































































































































































































































information results into more defensive avoidance, message
derogation and perceived manipulation than presenting low
threat information. More important, none of these effects
were moderated by individual differences in need for cogni-
tion.
To summarize so far, these findings provided strong sup-
port for our hypotheses and suggest that need for cognition
maybean important,butalso restrictingvariable inmotivating
people to adopt behavior that can prevent certain health
threats. Only people who are high in need for cognition may
profit from confrontations with fear appeals. Threatening in-
formation seems to motivate them to engage more into healthy
action, although they may also react defensively to threat in-
formation (see our results on fear control). In contrast, people
who are low in need for cognition do not seem to be motivated
by fear-evoking persuasive campaigns. Their reactions to fear
appeals may be easily dominated by defensive responses.
Thus, our findings contrast Witte and Allen’s (2000) con-
clusion that individual differences do not appear to have an
important role in responses to fear appeals. However, this
conclusion was mainly made with respect to the role of trait
anxiety, for which indeed no consistent relationship with per-
suasion outcomes has been found yet. Taken together, our
study is one of the few studies that tested the role of need for
cognition in reactions to fear appeals. Future research is re-
quired to examine the impact of other individual difference
variables affecting responses to fear appeals.
If need for cognition indeed influences the acceptance of
recommended action in reactions to threatening information,
as our data suggest, then it is important to examine what pro-
cesses mediate the effects of need for cognition on the rela-
tionship between fear appeals and precautionary action.
Many studies on the role of need for cognition in the process-
ing of persuasive messages suggest that people high in need
for cognition spend more cognitive effort in processing the
information presented to them, relative to people low in need
for cognition. In addition, provided that the argumentation is
strong and the recommended action is presented as effective
and feasible (measures of efficacy beliefs indicated that we
were successful in this), systematic processing of the pre-
sented persuasive information should increase adoption of
the recommended action among people for whom the threat
is relevant (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Rogers, 1983).
However, we hasten to say that the extent to which people
high in need for cognition indeed systematically processed
breast self-examination information, after being confronted
with threatening information about breast cancer, and, as
such not using their perception of threat as a peripheral cue,
could not be directly derived from our data. We suggest that
future research should include more specific measures that
are capable of tracking the cognitive processes mediating the
effects of need for cognition in responses to fear appeals.
In addition to lacking insight into the mediating cognitive
processes, a further limitation of this study is that its findings
may not generalize beyond the specific behavioral domain of
breast cancer detection and the subpopulation of highly edu-
cated young women. Future research should examine
whether or not the reported findings also hold across other
domains of self-protective action, and among other
subpopulations including men, lower educational levels, and
other age groups. Furthermore, this research did not include
the performance of breast self-examination as a dependent
variable to measure behavior. Including breast self-examina-
tion performance in the analyses requires a follow-up mea-
sure outside the laboratory. However, when including such a
variable, sufficient measures should be taken to control for
possible negative effects of the threat manipulation when
participants have left the controlled setting of the laboratory.
Of course, this should happen without neutralizing the threat
manipulation, which may prove to be a difficult task. Behav-
iors that can be observed in the laboratory may remain the
best feasible way to measure behavior in response to threat-
ening information.
This study suggests that fear appeals are more effective
among people high in need for cognition than among people
low in need for cognition. Although people’s need for cogni-
tion is difficult to change, our findings do reveal important
practical implications when considering the use of fear ap-
peals. For instance, the use of the computer (e.g., com-
puter-tailored advice, see Brug & de Vries, 1999) may make
it possible to measure participants’ need for cognition in ad-
vance and adjust persuasive messages to the reported level of
need for cognition. For example, people high in need for cog-
nition may receive cognitive challenging information,
whereas people low in need for cognition should be per-
suaded via more peripheral routes. Alternatively, information
may be provided in such a way that people high in need for
cognition have the opportunity to access additional materials.
However, our findings may also be translated from a person-
ality context to a conceptually identical situational context.
That is, higher levels of need for cognition have been associ-
ated with more systematic processing, and our findings sug-
gest that fear appeals work better for people who are high in
need for cognition. Thus, content-related processing of the
persuasive message should be promoted among people low
in need for cognition, not by designing “funny black humor”
or sarcastic messages with a deeper meaning, or by present-
ing health education messages between commercials for beer
and detergents, but by presenting information that is easy to
understand and to the point in indicating the recommended
action and its effectiveness and feasibility in reducing the
threat.
Finally, the extent to which fear appeals are useful at all in
persuasive communications remains an important and inter-
esting question in itself. Indeed, we found main effects of
threat information on measures of fear control independent
of people’s need for cognition. Thus, fear-arousing informa-
tion can easily be followed by emotional reactions instigating







denial or avoidance of the presented information, which may
interfere with the adoption of the recommended action
(Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987; Witte & Allen, 2000). This find-
ing raises doubt about the renewed interest in fear arousal
that we particularly witness in health education practice in
The Netherlands. Examples with respect to this renewed in-
terest are commercials that show traffic accidents with
bloody and deadly consequences, and the enlarged and now
clearly visible printing of health warnings on cigarette pack-
ages (e.g., “smoking may result in a slow and painful death”).
Obviously, program developers presume that fear arousal di-
rectly motivates people to safer behavior. Our findings with
regard to defensive responses, however, suggest that fear
arousal should be used with greater caution and preceded by
extensive pilot testing. Furthermore, these messages should
be sustained with strong appeals to the effectiveness and fea-
sibility of recommended action to decrease fear control and
increase danger control.
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